ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY

of the

1ST BATTALION (AIRBORNE) 12TH CAVALRY

1 JANUARY 1966 - 31 December 1966

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1ST BATTALION (ABN) 12TH CAVALRY

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)

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INTRODUCTION

1 January 1966 - 31 June 1966

The Chargers celebrated their first 6 months as a reconstructed unit on the first of January 1966. The 1st Cavalry Division of Korea and the 2nd Infantry Division of Tt. Benning, Ta., exchanged unit designations; the 11th Air Assault Division retired their Colors and together with the remainder of the 2nd Infantry Division at Tt. Benning were redesignated the 1st Air Cavalry Division on 1 July 1965. The 1st Air Cavalry Division then sped through a 90-day training-readiness program and at the end of August moved to Vietnam. As the Army's first Air mobile Division, it placed into practice the new concept of a heli-borne division, with maximum emphasis on fire power, flexib lity and mobility. The success of this new concept was herne out continually in operations against the Viet Cong.

The Chargers spent more than 4 out of the first 6 months of 1966 in actions against the Viet Cong. This history covers the major operations of the battalion: Operation latador, Lasher & White Wing, Jim Bowie, Lincoln & Bosby, Grazy Horse, and a portion of Mathan Hale. The battalion both started and ended its second 6 months in Mietnam on combat operations. In addition to the operations, mention is made of some civil action programs and transitory periods between operations.

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OPERATION MATADOR

1 January 1966 - 23 January 1966

The general concept of "Operation Matador" was to operate with the lst Brigade on a search and destroy mission in western Pleiku Province, and in the southern part of Kontum Province. The 1st Battalion (Abn), 12th Cavalry received the mission of securing Highway 19 for the road move from An Khe to the assembly area, the Cateska Tea plantation, which was later named Stadium.

The 1st Battalion (Abn), 12th Cavalry had Companies A and B airlifted out to secure the west and east side of Highway 19 respectively. While securing the critical points such as intersections, bridges and critical terrain around the highway the companies conducted short reconnaissance patrols. With the positioning of Companies A and B, the battalion, after a short review on ambush and counterambush techniques, jumped into sand-bagged vehicles and proceeded for Stadium in 4 March Units, with a total of 113 vehicles under the command of the Battalion Executive Officer,
Major Cantrall, While making the move there was a platoon of the 2nd Battalion, 20th Aerial Rocket Artillery on continuous call, The entire road move to Stadium was completed without incident and the security elements finally joined the main body on 3 January 1966 after seeing the remaining elements of the brigade through.

The fourth of January 1966 found Bravo Company making a helicopter assault north to Duc Co near the Cambodian border for search and destroy eperations, moving north into southern Kontum Province. They made a total of 3 airmobile assaults into unsecure Landing Zones and on the 5th of January the 2nd Platoon captured two Viet Cong and found a large rice cache in an abandoned village. During the mission, the terrain remained very thickly vegetated and difficult to traverse.

Alpha and Charlie Companies moved out on air assaults on the 6th. Alpha moved out to a large burned out village northeast of the Duc Co Special Forces Camp to secure an LZ for an artillery battery and encountered no enemy initiall, However, the 2nd Platoon flushed some Viet Cong suspects from a bunker and Alpha Company continued sweeping southwest searching for a suspected Viet Cong Prisoner of War camp which an alleged Vietnamese escapee, captured by the 1st Platoon, reported. He said that 50 Americans were in the camp Which was lightly defended, but the search proved futile and Alpha Company returned to secure the artillery. The ninth of January found Alpha jumping a distance of 12 feet from choppers (unable to get lower due to the terrain and undergrowth) in an air assault. The company joined up with a Special Forces Sergeant and a platoon of Civil Irregular Defense Guard Strikers; their mission was to screen an area seeded by time detonated bombs. The operation resulted in the capture of one VCS. Meanwhile, Charlie Commany made an assault near the Cambodian border for search and destroy operations until the 10th when they returned to the Stadium for two days before returning again to the border.

The battalion returned to the base camp at An Khe on 19 January 1966. The battalion had no solid contact with the enemy while out on "Operation Matador" but it provided good training, particularly for the newly assigned men, after a long lull in base camp during December. As the battalion was already scheduled for another operation on the 24th of January, first priority went to maintenance, resupply and equipment rather than relaxation. However, this time was a breather and broke the constant strain of continuous missions. During this four-day period, 2LT Lewis Anderson joined the battalion and assumed command of the 1st Platoon of Bravo Company.

While on "Operation Matador" the battalion engaged in several civil affairs projects. The battalion received word from brigade that a Vietnamese village in the vicinity of Pleiku wanted to relocate. and that the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 12th Cavalry was assigned the evacuation. The extraction group lead by Major Cantrall and Captain Steimert, the S-2, moved 3000 meters from the battalion base to the village. On the way they passed a montangard village where we had conducted sick call the day before. Upon arrival at the village members of the team moved out to insure the security of the area. The village Chief was then told that this was the day of extraction and that they had a total of four hours to be ready for the move. The villagers with the help of the team met the deadline and loaded 6 sorties of CH 47's full of personnel, livestock, food, furniture, and equipment. At dusk the last chinook lifted off carrying the last of the livestock and the security force. It was ironical that the major problem of the day was not the meeting of the time schedule but rather the moving of one last bull from the pick-up zone. Here brute strength won out over cunning and the animal was dragged aboard. The day ended with 200 Vietnamese being relocated in New Pleiku, a resettlement town.

The second civil affairs project concerned a rice thresher which was picked up in a VC-controlled area and carried back to Camp Padcliff. The rice thresher was worth about \$500.00 (American), but was broken and would cost \$200.00 to repair. Upon conference with the Village Chief of Song Ton, (the local village for which the battalion was assigned civil affairs responsibility), it was agreed that we would give them the machine if the village built the housing for it and raised a loan for the repair cost which could easily be repaid out of profits from the mill. Thus on

the 5th of May 1966 Captain Maxwell, the Pattalion Civil Affairs Officer, formally gave the village Chief the thresher which definitely helped the village prosper.

OPERATION MASHER/WHITE WING

24 January 1966 - 12 March 1966

The battalion was attached to the 3rd Brigade for "Operation Masher" which was to take place in the northeastern section of Binh Dinh Province. This particular area is a very rich and fruitful agricultural section. The operation was to have three phases, the first of which was to take place between 24 and 30 January, with the battalion seizing and securing the Phu Cat rifle range for use by the 3rd Forward Support Element and supporting aircraft. The battalion(minus one company which was to secure the 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery on the 23rd) had the additional task of being on a two-hour alert status.

The 23rd of January found Alpha Company securing an eight-inch battery, from the 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery, and a 175mm self-propelled howitzer battery, from the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, on a convoy moving 50 kilometers north of Qui Nhon on Highway 1. They spent eight days securing the artillery and then moved north to the brigade forward base. On the 23rd the battalion was airlifted to secure Phu Cat; Company B landed on the north and Company C landed on the south with both conducting patrols in their respective areas. The Reconnaissance Platoon of Delta Company constituted the battalion reserve, Delta's mortar platoon was in general support and its anti-tank platoon provided the battalion security. The lift to Phu Cat took 24 UH-1Ds and 14 CH-47 sorties with all units closing by 1230 hours with negative enemy contact.

On the 25th of January, the battalion sent out a Long Range Patrol on a three day reconnaissance mission of the near by hill masses to the east for the purpose of reporting the trails in the area. At approximately the same time Bravo Company conducted an air assault 29 miles north of Jui Nhon near Highway 1, while Charlie Company found 500 pounds of rice which they had to destroy due to the lack of transportation facilities. After four more days of securing the brigade base, Company C was alerted and airlifted to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry; however, they were not committed and returned the same day. Bravo was committed to another area and flew by CH-47 40 kilometers north, landed and observed VC in a valley, and called ARA and artillery in on them. Bravo then conducted search and destroy operations ending up with only 5 VCS. The next day found both B and C Companies alerted and flown to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, this time C Company stayed while Bravo returned.

The 30th of January found Companies A, B and C on seek and kill operations with the Rattalion Command Post being secured by Delta Company. All the line companies moved on parallel axis southeast but initially had no contact. During the period 1550 - 1835 hours, Company C received small arms and automatic weapons fire incurring 2 KJAs and 4 WIAs; artillery and ARA were colled in with the result of 5 VCS being wounded and later evacuated. Another battalion LRP was dispatched to the northwest, it encountered 8 VC, killing 7 and capturing 1 VCS.

Phase II of "Operation Masher" began on 31 January. Prior to the actual operation it was believed that the 8th Peoples' Army of Vietnam Regiment and undetermined Main Force Units were in the area. Captured documents supported the existence of the 8th Regiment and indicated an infiltration into Binh Ding Province from Quang Nagai during the later

part of 1965. The enemy was expected to have the capability of battalion size operations. The terrain to the west had a moderately high canopy, excellent concealment and a network of trails while the terrain to the east was rice paddies with excellent fields of fire and prepared positions around the village.

On the last day of January, Commanies A, B, and C entered the Hy Van Village. This village had been controlled by the VC for years and all the inhabitants left. But with the help of a Psychological War Team they gradually came back and received medical aid, some being evacuated to a hospital. The next day the battalion returned to the site of C Company's recent engagement. C Company found 1 VC body and later captured 5 VCS on a night ambush—indications were that those captured were rice carries for a PAVN force in the area. Also, information from a Viet Cong Captive indicated a large FAVN force in the area, but there was negative contact and on 4 February at 1915 hours the battalion was alerted for operations in the An Lao Valley. The second phase of "Operation Masher" netted 9 VC KIAs and 13 VCSs captured. This supported the conclusion that the 8th Regiment was in the area but contrary to first appearances they had not infiltrated to the west.

The third phase of "Operation Masher" started on the fifth of February in the An Lao Valley. Prior to the operation it was believed that elements of the 8th PAVN Regiment were in the valley with a Weapons Battalion in the adjoining Hunji Long Valley. Intense automatic fire had been received by aircraft flying over the valley. In addition, captured documents supported the conclusion that Binh Hea and Can Duc hamlets in the vicinity could be defended by a company element. The terrain in the An Lao Valley

accorded good observation and fields of fire, but cover and concealment were good from the air as the valley sides were approached.

On 5 February, the battalion was air-lifted south in preparation for a sweep of the An Iao Valley. However, bad weather post-oned the sweep until the seventh. Even then the initial move into the area was held up four hours due to adverse weather.

The weather finally broke on the 7th and Bravo Company was air-lifted to the eastern side of the mountains and spent the remainder of that day and the 8th sweeping down the eastern side. The First Platoon made a brief contact with the VC, killed one and captured one M-l rifle. They also secured a ridge overlooking the battalion axis of attack. Meanwhile at 0800 on the 7th, Alpha and Charlie Companies moved on parallel axes to an attack position short of the village objective and had a specially rigged "Gas Helicopter" on call. At 1355, Company A received small arms fire from the village and called ARA's and artillery in; then under the cover of smoke A and C Companies advanced over open rice fields and at 1445 entered the village unopposed, capturing 3 VCS, 1 VC and some weapons. On the eighth of February, when A and C Companies moved past the ridge held by Bravo, the battalion captured 2 more VCS and one more VC plus equipment. The 9th was spent moving through 3 more objectives with no contact of any consequence.

From "Operation Masher" in the An Iao Valley we moved into "Operation White Wing" which took place in a valley complex southwest of the An Iao Valley which resembles an "Eagle's Claw" or "Crow's Foot". The concept of the operation was for A and C Companies to act as blocking elements in each valley end with B Company making a show of strength

moving from the mouth of the valley complex south and west up the valley driving the VC into the other company's blocking position. This operation was also divided up into phases, the first one starting on the 11th and lasting ten days.

The battalion made an assault into the objective area at 1430 on the eleventh of February with Charlie Company leading and finding antihelicopter stakes in the LZ. This held up the landing of the force by 15 minutes while the field was cleared. While A and B were moving and securing their respective areas Company C made contact with 10 VC killing one and sustaining 3 WIA, with one later dying of his wounds. Company A immediately thereafter made contact with 6 VC but after a short engagement found only some packs, a bloodstained hat, VC flag and two blood trails. At 1400 Bravo Company observed an estimated VC reinforced squad with automatic weapons and called in TAC air and artillery. After searching the strike area, they found 5 dead VC, two Chicom rifles, two 12.7s HMG with spare berrels plus wheels and anti-aircraft tripods. A IRP was lifted to the north and made several sightings of small VC groups but engaged in no contact.

On the 13th, Bravo had a report from the 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry helicopter that there were enemy personnel to their front. They captured a sniper, received some fire from a village and had the village cleared by supporting fire. Approximately 2000 meters further up, the first and third platoons came under fire from a hill which dominated the entire area, but fortunately the fire was premature and allowed everyone to ocramble to safety. The supporting fires, supplemented by the first platoon's 90mm RR, effectively suppressed the enemy. The second platoon flanked the enemy position from the left and the third platoon flanked from the right.

while the first, in the center, supported by fire. Only a few VC were found alive on the hill and these were dispatched in their holes; the body count for the VC was 6 with an estimated half a dozen more wounded escaping. Bravo Company had been able to take a well fortified critical defensive position while only receiving one slight casualty.

On the 14th of February, one of A Company's local patrols made contact with an unknown number of VC and immediately brought in artillery and TAC air. They received one WIA from a booby trap and experienced that small percentage of friendly casualties, which forever plague the books when receiving friendly supporting fire, by sustaining 2 WIA from the Air Strikes. Upon entering the strike area they found one grenade factory, a mess hall and a twenty bed hospital. The 14th also saw the IRP making contact with an unknown number of VC. They killed 4 VC and wounded an estimated 10 more while sustaining 2 WIAs. Artillery was called in to cover their withdrawl and due to the terrain and dense vegetation they were extracted by a hovering CH-47 by climbing in through the rear ramp via a troop ladder.

A Radio Research Unit team attached to the Brigade picked up VC radio transmissions and was able to take a fix on the transmitting site. The battalion was given the mission of finding the site. The battalion flow to IZs near the objective with A and B Companies moving northwest and C and D Companies moving south and northeast respectively. Alpha Company became engaged on the 15th with 7 VC in a cave, found some Vietnamese rucksacks, one body and several women believed to be nurses. The afternoon of the 16th they lifted back to position Bird and four days of rest, cold beer and bathing in a river. While in this location they were joined by IT Gordon Fardal who had just recently arrived from CONUS.

Companies B and C had a little more luck and contact while hunting for the enemy transmitting site. Bravo spent three days searching for the site and found everything but that. On the 15th, they came across 7 VC bodies, 12 packs, and both wounded and captured a VC. SGT adamson and SP4 Grace of the third platoon were wounded and here again the mobility of the 1st Cavalry Division met the challenge. Both men were hoisted out of a thickly vegetated area into a CH-47 and then safely and immediately evacuated where conventional methods of evacuation would have been impossible for several hours. The company of the day however, proved to be C Company. Their 3rd Platoon found a commo cache containing approximately \$100,000.00 (US) worth of equipment, however, they also failed to locate the transmitter site and received two WIA for their efforts during the next four days. The last four days of the search netted the battalion two .50 caliber machineguns, 10 packs, eight 60mm rounds, 6 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA and 10 VCS. All units were returned to the battalion base at Bird by 1045 on 20 February. Once again the LRP was utilized, this time as a stay behind force with the reward of getting 5 VC KIA.

"Operation White Wing II" started on the 22nd of February and ran. through the 28th. Once again the 18th PaVN Regiment supported by a heavy weapons battalion was believed to be in the area. Although the operation began on the 22nd, A and C Companies made an air assault and search on the 21st. At the same time some ARVN made contact with a VC force 15 miles south of Bird which resulted in B Company being sent out to form a blocking force.

If. Jimmic Smith, B Company's Executive Officer, was acting commander since CFT Klein had finally succeeded in going on R&R. The company landed

on a mountain side and worked down toward a saddle to set up the blocking position. A reconnaissance element was sent forward into the saddle and reported negative contact. The 2nd Platoon then started entering the saddle which was very thickly foliaged. The platoon almost instantly met intense small arms fire coming from well dug in and camouflaged positions which were located in an almost impenetrable mass of vines and growth. The platoon was unable to manuever left or right due to steep drop offs on either side. The platoon started receiving casualties from the accurate enemy fire. The medic, PFC Mack, was killed moving forward to render aid to a wounded man and the platoon withdrew calling in heavy artillery and TAC air. After the supporting fires lifted, scout ships rejorted 13 VC KIA and the 3rd Platonn assaulted the position. They reached the previous point of contact and also came under intense and accurate fire. The company's mortar platoon delivered immediate and accurate fire but was unable to dislodge the enemy. PFC McDonald, only recently assigned, was killed and the platoon leader, IT Baker, was seriously wounded along with several others before the platoon withdrew. The situation remained unchanged as darkness approached. That evening CPT Klein returned from R&R, the injured were evacuated, and continuous artillery fire was called on the saddle.

The following morning the 1st Platoon flanked the VC positions as much as possible while the 2nd Platoon swept through it. No enemy were encountered, 7 VC bodies were found with weapons. Intelligence reports later revealed that this had been a VC Regimental Command Post. The rest of the battalion was lifted to Bravo's general vicinity and conducted search and destroy operations.

The 23rd of February found C Company heavily engaged. While sweeping

engaged for 7 hours, still being in contact at dusk. Alpha Company and remained engaged for 7 hours, still being in contact at dusk. Alpha Company marched south to set up blocking positions in the valley below Charlie. At 1315 the load elements of Alpha's 1st and 3rd Platoens saw personnel running away to their front, were almost immediately engaged by intense automatic weapons fire and received several casualties. If Hunter, the artillery FO, called in artillery and TAC air. The VC were extremely well dug in and presented very poor targets. If Wayne Davis, the 1st Platoen Leader, was seriously wounded and the 3rd Platoen Leader, IF Donald Adamson, was killed. The 2nd Platoen was committed to evacuate the casualties. If Byard, the Company XO, brought in the Medevac choppers thus speeding up the evacuation. The company then consolidated its position.

the scene of the previous day's action, finding four 75mm RRs, seven 3.7 RLs, three IMGs, 5 KLms and estimating that 30 VC had been wounded. The enemy fortification extended 1000 meters up the valley and documents found indicated it was named by the 7th Battalion, 18th PLVN Regiment. Meanwhile Bravo kept up its sweep west on the valley floor and encountered a maize of enemy bunkers and foxholes. It took them almost 2 days to clear a 1500 meter revine. A succession of VC were encountered and had to be dug out. The thick foliage procluded effective artillery fire and even a try with CS gas proved of no significant help. In the end it was up to the individual crawling forward under fire dropping grenades in the holes. It was in such an operation that SGT Nevin from the lst Platoon was killed and several others wounded.

By the 25th of February the battalion had completed its search of the

entire area of operations and all units were lifted to Bird. The battalion remained at Bird until the 27th when it returned to An Khe via 17 sorties of CH-47s. Of particular note was the effective use of the LRP which acted as reconnaissance patrols, ambush patrols and stay behind forces and accounted for 13 VC KIA, and 5 enemy weapons while sustaining only 2 minor casualties. While at position Bird, LT Arthur West rejoined the battalion as a platoon leader in Bravo Company. LT West had been seriously wounded in an operation in November and was eventually evacuated all the way to Walter Reed Army Hospital. Despite the fact that his serious wound automatically relieved him of the remainder of his Vietnamese committment he volunteered to and did return to his unit to serve out his full tour.

The battalion had spent 35 continuous days in the field and was more than happy to return to Camp Radcliff. March 1st through the 3rd was spent in resupply, maintaining and repairing equipment. It also saw some more personnel changes in the battalion, LTs Herbert Glazer and William Crow were assigned to B Company's, Weapons and 2nd Platoon respectively, and LT Quigley moved up to the Executive Officer position with LT Smith becoming a Battalion Liason Officer. The fourth through the tenth found the companies on short search and destroy missions around the base camp and also found one or two companies securing the An Khe Pass for a couple of days with no contact being made.

OPERATION JIM BOWIE

13 March 1966 - 24 March 1966

The 13th of March saw the battalion out on another operation. The area of operations was once again in the vicinity of the "Eagle's Claw"

where intelligence believed a division or higher headquarters with combat support was operating. There was a further possibility that an unidentified regiment was located in the vicinity just north-est of the An Lao Valley. The order for the operation "Jim Bowie" was received on the 9th with an execution date of 10 harch. The order for the operation placed the battalion as the brigade blocking force with one company as brigade blocking force, one company as brigade reserve on 30 minutes alert, and the battalion (minus) on brigade reserve 2 hour alert to move to blocking positions anywhere in the sector. The operation received a 72 hour stay which afforded the troops some actual relaxation as no plans for such a situation had been made and thus no details or duties were scheduled.

Operation "Jim Bowie" jumped off at 1225 the 13th of March with the battalion moving to 4 separate LZs in 104 sorties of UH-1Ds and 1 CH-47 with all closing at 1500. There was negative enemy contact although two punji stake wounds were received by Alpha Company. The flexibility of the battalion and the airmobile concept was shown when Delta Company, due to inadequate reconnassiance and time, was initially bound for the wrong LZ. However, the error was corrected enroute by close coordination between the Battalion S-3 and the lift company commander. The correct landing was made without a hitch including the artillery and ARA preparatory fires.

Company B was designated the reaction force, but was not sent out. The battalion remained in position with the exception of Alpha who conducted extensive patrolling, ambush and blocking missions. They had no contact but ran into punji stakes, a field of man traps and a rash of malaria cases. One unusual problem was encountered on the 16th when 16 men came down with food poisoning believed to have been caused by some

defective "C" rations. The Battalion Surgeon was flown in to conduct medical check ups and inspect the rations and water. The 12th saw Alpha, followed by the rest of the battalion, conduct an air assault into Binh Dinh Province approximately 40 kilometers north of An Khe and for two days, while fighting leaches, they found a VC supply route through the jungle, 10 feet wide complete with wooden stairs. To top this off was a 100 foot suspension bridge constructed of vines and bamboo.

The battalion joined A Company in Morthern Binh Dinh Province near the juncture with Quang Ngai and Kontum Province for the second phase of operation "Jim Bowie". This phase lasted two days and resulted in no major enemy contact, with Bravo receiving some inconsequential sniper fire. As a result of numerous assaults and vigorous patrolling, the battalion found extensive trails, elephant tracks, and some khaki uniforms in addition to the supply route and bridge found by Alpha Company. On the 20th, the battalion loaded aboard 88 sorties of UH-IDs and returned to An Khe.

The period 21 March through 24 March was an uneventful one. Perhaps it was enjoyed all the more because of this. There were no significant personnel changes or activities, just the usual repairs, resupply, maintenance of equipment and relaxation after everything else was done. The operation order for our next mission came out on the 24th and the troops were ready.

OPERATION LINCOLN/MOSBY

25 March 1966 - 15 May 1966

Operation Lincoln called for a "Search and Destroy" mission to be performed by the 1st Brigade along the Cambodian Border in western Plieku,

Intelligence sources believed that elements of the 3rd PAVN Regiment and Main Force units were in the area with a reinforcement capability of battalion size within 24 hours. The terrain afforded good observation and fields of fire in the sparcely vegetated high grounds with only the stream beds being thick with foliage. The two key terrain features were the Ia Krel River which ran east and west and Highway 19 going south.

The operation started according to schedule with the battalion in order of Bravo, Forward Command Post, Charlie, Delta and Alpha moving to Duc Co Special Forces Cemp via 8 sorties of C-130's closing at 1234 hours. Immediate deployment from the Special Forces camp found Headquarters and Delta moving over land to area Pearl while the other three companies made air assaults into LZs. All companies reported negative initial enemy contact. However, Bravo caught sight of 5 VC and killed one while Alpha discovered a company size bivouac area.

The period 25 through 29 March found A Company making the only significant contact. After arrival at Duc Co on the 25th they made an air assault in an area just southwest of HW 19. The next day they moved 5000 meters west and set up their camp 1000 meters from the Cambodian Border. At this time the 1st Platoon was dispatched with a Special Forces SGT and Montangard guide to an ambush site approximately 1500 meters north on the Ia Krel River. The guide had reported that several times while posing as a fisherman he had encountered over 100 VC near the river. At dark the ambush patrol observed some VC filling canteens but held their fire hoping for a larger body. Their restraint and patience was well rewarded when early the next morning 12 VC started across the river to the site. The ambush went off like clock work and when the firing lifted there were 7 VC KIA, an estimated 5 wounded, two pistols, four assault rifles and assorted

gear left. After the contact the remainder of the company marched north to reinforce and gave het pursuit resulting in the capture of 1 VC and his weapon.

The night of 27 March found another A Company ambush killing one VC and wounding four more. The patrol withdrew south, calling 105 and 155 artillery support. In addition to this, they received support from "Puff the Magic Dragon", a CH-47 equipped with a Minnie gun which fires 6000 20mm rounds per minute, and "Smokey the Bear", a flare ship. The payoff however, was a reconnaissance patrol north of the river which recovered \$200,000.00 (VN) Piastres and documents. One captured PAVN soldier identified a previously unknown unit as the 2nd Battalion, 141st Regiment, 312th Division. Alpha Company moved to the Turkey Farm to secure a helicopter unit on the 29th, and, eventhough on a 30 minute reaction force, received hot chow and cold beer.

Phase two of the operation arrived with little information on the enemy and his capabilities. We were later to learn to our chagrin that the 18th Regiment, 325th Division, 6th Regiment (unidentified elements) and elements of the 304th Division were operating in the area. The enemy had mortar support and all weapons were in excellent shape which lead to the conclusion that they were relatively new in the area. The terrain again offered good fields of fire and observation with the stream bods thickly vegetated.

The concept of the operation was to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry of the security of the aviation base camp and then secure the Brigade Command Post while acting as the brigade reserve, with Company A on a 30 minute alert.

On 30 March all units of the battalion had closed to Oasis, the brigade base, acting as the brigade security and reserve. Commany A was almost immediately alerted to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry in contact

UH-IDs at 1630 on a mission to secure 3 downed helicopters, evacuated the survivors and rescued the remaining elements of the 1st Battalion, 9th Cavaly. Aerial rocket helicopters were on continual call as the operation would be out of range of conventional tube artillery.

Company A landed at LZ Eagle at 1705 and moved north toward the downed helicopters and in 15 minutes made enemy contact receiving fire from the north and northwest. ARA and TAC air were called in to suppress the fires; at 1732 CPT Drake, the company commander, was seriously wounded, and LT Britten, the executive officer took over. The small arms and automatic weapons fire increased and the company XO was killed while helping to extract the casualties; lst LT Vurzbacher took command and the company withdrew to its original LZ bringing their casualties. A night extraction under the support of TAC air and ARAs, by CH-47s and UH-1Ds was attempted at 1038 hours and subsequently aborted when the initial aircraft the CH-47, was shot down, receiving approximately 70 hits.

The night for Company A was going to be a long one. They formed a small perimeter around the downed CH-47, surrounded by an unknown number of VC while running low on ammo. The bulk of the fire support came from the TAC air and ARA with illumination coming from "Smokey the Bear". The officer responsible for the direction and coordination of these supporting fires and later tube artillery when it displaced forward was the attached artillery FO, LT Hunter. The critical point of the night however, was the resupply of ammo by CV 2. Heavy drops had been practiced and successfully completed by the division in the states but that was under ideal conditions. The night was quite dark and the LZ was small and surrounded by tall trees. The CV 2

made an initial free reconnaissance pass and received intense fire. The Caribou then, heedless of the enemy fire, made two more passes dropping first amme and second "C" rations. The first drop stopped just 50 meters north of the perimeter and the second landed 70 meters south. LT Becker, a plateon leader, lead a party out and recovered the ammunition thus eliminating the critical ammo shortage.

At 0710 hours on 31 March the battalion, in the order of C, B, and D Companies, was air lifted to LZ Eagle and closed by 0925. LT Byard, a battalion LFO, took over A Company and along with D Company searched the area in the vicinity of Eagle while Charlie and Bravo searched to the north and south. All elements of the battalion made light contact with small groups of VC trying to exfiltrate. The total VC casualties as of 31 March at 1900 was 49 KIA, 4 WIA captured with friendly casualties of 14 KIA and 14 WIA. There were no April fools day jokes as the battalion continued to make light contact and the VC body count went up to 63.

On the second of April, the battalion found that the VC had not entirely exfiltrated. At 0300 hours the battalion (minus) located at LZ Eagle was attacked by an unknown number of VC supported by small arms, automatic weapons, rocket launchers and 82mm mortars. The main probe came from the north and east by an estimated reinforced company element in conjunction with a mortar attack which resulted in a proximately 20 rounds falling in the perimeter, wounding three men from Company A. "Smokey the Bear", "Puff", ARA and artillery were called in to suppress the enemy fires. During the night, a hand grenade killed two more men from Alpha on the eastern side of the perimeter. Contact was finally broken at daylight and an immediate pursuit by D Company was instituted. A total of 4 VC bodies and 5 weapons were found just outside the perimeter to the northeast.

Company A continued to patrol in the vicinity of LZ Eagle while Delta pursued the VC north. At 1230 Delta had made no contact and thus prepared for airlift back to Eagle. But even as the ships were inbound an estimated platoon of VC attacked their position. The battle which insued found 5 VC KIA while Delta received 2 WIA. A scout helicopter supporting the battalion was sent to the area to locate the enemy. With the arrival of the ATA and TAC air, the scout ship dropped marking smoke and directed the attack. Meanwhile Charlie Company, located just west of the action, moved in to reinforce and finally made a link up just after the VC broke contact. Both units pursued the enemy to the north making heavy contact at 1535 hours. At 1600 CPT Mchillan, Charlie Company Commander, was killed and the XO, LT Chase assumed command. Sixteen sorties of TAC air were employed in addition te artillery and a "Gas" helicopter. At 1761 CPT Warren, Delta's commander, assumed command of Charlie Company and Delta's XO was alerted for Delta's extraction and return to Eagle when Bravo landed as their replacement. At 1800 all moves were completed. Five minutes later all supporting fires were lifted and Charlie attempted to move to the north, but continued to receive heavy small arms fire from the VC positions. As darkness fell B and C Companies formed a perimeter. The results of the engagement so far was 11 VC KIA versus 4 friendly KIA and 4 WIA. Re-entry into the area on the morning of the 3rd of April resulted in the finding of more VC bodies.

On 3 April all units moved north and west to blocking positions to prevent the VC from moving west and across the Cambodian Border. Again the units made numerous light contacts with small groups of VC trying to get into Cambodia. The Battalion Command Post and Delta Company moved from Eagle to another area, Hawk, while Charlie Company started moving to blocking

position White and made contact with an estimated VC platoon, called in ARA forcing the VC to withdraw leaving 6 KIA and 15 weapons. Company A continued its move north and joined Charlie for a perimeter that night. The following day Alpha moved out to blocking positions and all units conducted patrols. At 1435 a VC squad attacked Charlie Company at position "White" and withdrew after an ARA attack left 6 enemy KIA. The pursuing troops followed the VC to a commo cache and what seemed to be a Command Fost for a regimental size unit.

The 5th and 6th of April found Alpha Company making contacts. An ambush at 0220 on the fifth killed two VC. A search at first light indicated that the VC had been part of a water carrying party. At 1115 another patrol killed a VC. Approximately 3 hours later Charlie Company was probed by a VC squad at position "Thite". The attack was launched from the west and broken up by supporting fire. Charlie Company, moving to the west, found numerous bunkers and finally returned to position "White" at 1910. The next day at 1315 they were again probed by a VC platoon which withdrew after receiving supporting fire and were pursued by C Company for 300 meters with Charlie Company receiving 3 WIA and the VC an estimated 12 KIA and 10 WIA. The morning of the 6th found Alpha moving overland to LZ Eagle on an air assault for a search and clear operation to the north and west with no contact being made.

The next two days consisted of patroling and 'locking operations in the same vicinity. Bravo found three 82mm rounds, packs, killed 2 VC and captured one while an element of Delta's reconnaissance platoon ran into 6 VC and substained 1 WIA. C Company continued its run of fate and was probed at position "White" for the fourth time, but once again the enemy withdrew after being hit by ARA and artillery. The element of the reconnaissance platoon

meanwhile continued to receive fire and suffered 1 KIA and 6 WIA. The remainder of the reconnaissance platoon was air lifted as reinforcement along with two platoons from Alpha who were air lifted to blocking positions south of the action. Supporting fires were called in and the remainder of Alpha Company moved north to the site of the action and captured three VC hiding in a creek. Once again the scout helicopter proved invaluable by sighting and marking enemy positions and targets. When Alpha linked up with the reconnaissance platoon they had a total of 7 VC KIA. That evening there was a medical evacuation of a seriously wounded man from A Company which took place under the illumination of "Smokey the Bear's" flares. The remainder of the night found the reconnaissance platoon and the two platonns from Alpha returning to the scene of the action, finding 12 VC KIA and 12 WIA.

On the 8th, the battalion started moving back to brigade base at position Oasis on 68 sorties of UH-lDs and 5 sorties of CH-47s. The total enemy losses as of the 8th at 2400 hours were 160 VC KIA, 12 VCS and 96 weapons captured. The battalion spent the next two days at Oasis preparing for the next mission to take place in Kontum.

Operation "Mosby" which took place in Kontum ran from 10 April until 16 April. Prior to the operation no enemy units had been identified or known to be located in the area of operations. It was believed that certain infiltration routes and equipment caches were located in the area of operations.

Thus on 10 April the battalion minus B and C Companies was air lifted in 12 CV-2s from Oasis to Kontum with the mission of division reserve and as such was billeted in abandoned ARVN buildings near the Division Command Post. At the same time, Bravo Company was attached to the 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry for operations in the vicinity of Dak To while Charlie Company remained

at the "Turkey Farm" securing the aviation lager base. The next 6 days found the battalion reacting to numerous alerts. First, on the 13th of April Delta Company was alerted for and secured an artillery battery near Duc Co. On the next day Bravo was returned to battalion control from the 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry. On the 15th, the battalion was alerted to send one company on a reaction mission to a location where an artillery convoy of 7 vehicles and 24 personnel had been ambushed and had a vehicle disabled. Charlie Company was committed from the "Turkey Farm" with the mission of insuring the movement of the convoy and aiding in the extraction of the disabled vehicle by CH-47. Charlie via 10 UH-1Ds landed and out flanked the suspected enemy positions but made negative contact thus allowing the free movement of the convoy. The disabled vehicle was successfully picked up, but due to a defective strap, the CH-47 dropped the vehicle and it had to be destroyed by ARA. The third alert was the movement of the battalion back to base camp. The entire battalion closed at Camp Radcliff on 17 April at 1530.

Psychological War Team and the scout helicopter. The Psychological War Team operated from an aircraft broadcasting to the VC near the Cambodian Border and had a demoralizing effect on the enemy, persuading some to give up as witnessed by the battalion when one PAVN soldier surrendered. The scout helicopters from the 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry were of immense aid in heavy engagements. They maintained surveillance, advised friendly troops of VC strengths, disposition, positions, movements, routes of advance and withdrawal and marked enemy positions and targets for TAC air and ARA by dropping smoke while completely disregarding the intense automatic

weapons fire. The battalion was honored to recommend CPT Albert McGee and CWO David Kortus for the Distinguished Flying Cross as pilots of scout helicopters serving the battalion during "Operation Lincoln".

The battalion spent the period of 7 through 20 April resting up from an exhausting series of operations ending with operation Mosby. For the first time in quite awhile we had no major operations planned in the immediate future. The continual combat strain was beginning to take its toll and the men learned that combat exhaustion, battle fatigue, call it what you may, was no myth. It was only by dent of superior leadership that the morale of the troops was as high as it was. But the troops knowing they were scheduled for a tour on the Barrier Line surrounding the camp recouped their strenth and improved remarkedly in morale.

On the 20th of April, the battalion plus Company B of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Gavalry, which was attached, relieved the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry of the Camp Radcliff Barrier Line responsibility. The Barrier Line is the outer defensive perimeter which is manned by a reinforced battalion. It lies behind a series of barbed wire fences with dug in positions, and towers placed about 300 meters apart. The battalion had this responsibility from the 20th through the 30th. While on the Barrier Line, the companies conducted extensive patrolling actions both day and night with little to no enemy contact. The line received periodic inspections and ran through two communications and two general alert practices.

The Barrier Line may allow the troops to rest and relax to an extent but the importance of the position is obvious and demanded the strictest attention of the men especially at night. On several nights attached radar sections would pick up small groups of VCS operations within 300 meters of the

line. On the evening of the 22nd, a radar team attached to Charlie Company followed the movement of 1 VCS 150 meters in front of one of the towers. The next morning marking stakes were found in the area. On the very next night, Bravo Company attached from the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry had a radar contact to their front and at 0800 on the 24th they found a 6 foot white arrow in front of their tower pointing to a 106mm position. In addition to these continued small probes, the battalion again suffered casualties from friendly fires. Here, some defective ammunition caused a short mortar round which landed 25 meters from one of the towers killing one and wounding several others. Thus once again the battalion became the victims of the unexpected, and unfortunately, unavoidable accident.

The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry relieved the battalion of the Barrier Line responsibility on the 30th of April. The battalion minus (Charlie Company was placed under the operational control of the relieving battalion) had the mission of conducting search and clear operations in the Tactical Area of Responsibility surrounding Camp Radcliff. The battalion also acted as the division reacion force with one company at base camp on a 30 minute alert status.

The period 1 May through 15 May was spent conducting numerous air assaults and search and clear operations in the TAOR. Although most of the operations resulted in negative enemy contact this was no picnic for the enemy could spring up at anytime and, when not physically present, were well represented by punji stakes and booby traps. The third of May Bravo encountered all three of the above. Upon landing in an LZ, sniper fire wounded one man, punji stakes wounded two more and awhile later a booby trap brought the friendly casualty total to 6 WIA.

On the fifth, the enemy once again provided a surprise by shooting down the battalion commander's ship as it approached for a landing at a supposedly secure LZ. The pilot received a gunshot wound in the head, but the rest of the occupants escaped unharmed. The battalion continued search and clear operations, received occasional sniper fire and uncovered some food caches and a bunker and tunnel complex.

OPERATION CRAZY HORSE

16 May 1966 - 24 June 1966

The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry ran into heavy enemy contact northeast of Camp Radcliff and as the division reaction force, the "Chargers" were committed and operation "Crazy Horse" commenced. Intelligence prior to the operation revealed that elements of the 2nd VC Regiment were in the area of operations. Information subsequently obtained placed portions of 6 different major enemy units in the area. The units were mostly PAVN and were equipped with good supporting fires to include mortars, recoilless rifles, and rockets which were used very effectively. The terrain was typical of that in the Central Highlands, with good observation and fields of fire in the valley and heavy vegetation and foliage obstructing movement and observation in the high ground.

The first phase of Operation "Crazy Horse" ran from 14 May through 23
May with Alpha Company being committed to LZ Herford at 1753 on the 16th
20 kilometers northwest of An Khe, reinforcing Company B of the 2nd Battalion,
8th Cavalry. Alpha received light sniper fire from a hilltop to the east and
Charlie Company of the Chargers was committed at 1845. Both companies were
engaged until night fall, and continued to receive probes and small arms fire
throughout the night. The next morning, Alpha received small arms and

rocket fire for over an hour, receiving 5 KIAs and 41 WIAs for both engagements.

On the 17th, Charlie Company was attached to the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry which was committed into the area of operations while Alpha continued to secure LZ Herford. Meanwhile, the battalion's forward command post and the 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery, secured by Company D, moved to position Cobra which was within sight of, and 3 kilometers south of Herford. Bravo also moved up to the forward command post for additional security and local patrolling missions, and was soon joined by the main command group.

The 21st saw some changes in attachments with Alpha being attached to the 3rd Brigade and returning to Camp Radcliff and Charlie being released from attachment. Charlie flew their mortar platoon to LZ Herford and then marched overland passing through the mortar position which would provide continuous support for the main body of the company being picked up on the valley floor. At 1425 hours Charlie Company had passed through their mortar positions and were almost 2000 meters down the hill. The mortar platoon was ordered extracted, but with the aircraft inbound for the pick up, their position was attacked with automatic weapons, P-40 rockets and 60mm mortars. At 1440 hours, an estimated VC company swarned onto the positions from a hill to the east just as the supporting fires were lifted. They overran the position, then split into two groups, one withdrawing back to the east and the other to the northwest. ARA and conventional artillery were called into the area and fired continuously into suspected routes of withdrawal.

The remainder of Charlie Company immediately marched back to Herford and Bravo was air lifted to a blocking position on a suspected route of with-drawal with both companies arriving at approximately 1550. Between 1600 and 1630 hours A and B Companies of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry were attached

to the Chargers; Alpha tried to regain dontact with the enemy and Bravo provided additional security for the CP. By nightfall only light contact had been made by the maneuvering forces. The friendly casualties totaled 16 KIA, 6 WIA and 1 MIA. During the night Company A, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry ambushed 3 VC and killed two.

On the morning of the 22nd of May, Charlie Company found 5 VC bodies.

Companies A and B of the 8th Cavalry had negative contact in their sweeps and were released from the battalion's operational control. Charlie

Company returned to the main CP leaving a platoon as a stay behind force on a hill overlooking Herford. Between 1722 and 1840 the platoon observed

30 VC checking the abandoned LZ and called in artillery, TAC air, and ARA.

The platoon estimated 12 VC KIA and 12 VC WIA. Meanwhile at 2230 hours approximately 15 mortar rounds were fired at the artillery and battalion CP at position Cobra. All rounds, however, fell short and there were no casualties. At dawn on the 23rd, the stay behind force spotted 15 VC moving onto LZ Herford and again directed artillery and TAC air on them. Approximately 15 minutes later 2 VC alked into the platoon position and were killed.

Phase II of operation "Crazy Horse" ran from 24 May through 31 May with the battalion establishing various blocking positions and ambush sites in order to prevent the enemy from withdrawing. Delta Company was retained for local security with the AT platoon as battalion reserve and Bravo as the reaction force on 30 minute alert. All units moved out to their predesignated positions for a minumum stay of three days without resupply. All positions were established by 1900 hours on the 24th with negative enemy contact. During the next 36 hours, maximum harassment and interdiction fires were employed in the area, accompanied by numerous TAC air and B-52 air strikes.

Alpha Company was released from the 3rd Brigade on the 25th and became the 1st Brigade reserve-reaction force. All companies remained in position until 30 May with no contact. During this time, Alpha and Bravo Companies exchanged missions as blocking and reaction forces. The early morning of the 31st showed that the VC were still in the area. Approximately 10 VC probed the CP and artillery positions in an attempt to destroy the artillery and aircraft persent. Two VC were killed, 2 VC captured, 1 weapon, four 2 lb. explosive charges and 24 grenades were captured.

The third and final phase of the operation was conducted at position Hotel, 20 kilometers east of Cobra and was terminated on the 5th of June. The mission was again to establish blocking positions and conduct local patrols in the sector. The last phase commenced on the 1st of June with the battalion in order of Companies A, B, C, D, and the forward CP group utilizing 85 sorties of UH-1Ds and 3 sorties of CH-47s moving to their assigned positions closing by 1600. Alpha, with the AT platoon attached, moved from their previous blocking positions to Cobra to secure the artillery units which remained while Eravo and Charlie and part of Delta moved to and secured the new CP area, Hotel. Bravo and Charlie conducted local patrolling actions with Charlie given the additional mission as battalion reserve.

On the third of June, an element of one of Bravo's blocking forces made contact with 2 VC, killing one. Bravo then moved to new blocking positions to the west. At 1835, a VC rallier walked into the perimeter at position Hotel and revealed that a VC company was located near by. Charlie Company, remaining at Hotel, conducted local patrols and tightened the security.

Acting on the intelligence received from the VC rallier, Alpha Company was released from its security mission to the west and airlifted to Hotel.

Upon arrival Alpha was further air lifted to an LZ near the suspected VC company with the mission of sweeping west for 2000 meters and then turning back to a new pick up zone. The AT platoon was sent in to bolster the CP security while Bravo, contunuing its blocking mission, reported finding an assortment of small arms ammo, four 82mm rounds, VC documents and assorted supplies. At 1630 hours on 4 June, four VC walked into Eravo's position from the east and two were killed.

At 0740 on the fifth of June, Company B was alerted to move to a suitable LZ for extraction to An Khe. Company A continued their sweep of the valley floor finding evidence of recent occupation of that area with several bunkers, tunnels and huts. At 1115 hours Delta started its extraction along with some portions of the battalion headquarters. By 1915 hours all elements of the battalion had closed at Camp Radcliff.

The battalion was once again at base camp and this time spent three days there prior to receiving the mission of securing a section of Highway 19 between An Khe and Pleiku. Here the companies set up on critical terrain paralleling the highway, and in addition to securing the passage for 5 or 6 convoys a day conducted local saturation patrols. Occasionally a VC3 would be spotted and once 4 or 5 VC fired on our troops but no major contact was encountered the 9th through the 25th of June. One interesting point was that this particular section of Highway 19 was where the French Mobile Group 100 was demolished. The very hill where the battalion set up its CP on was the grave site for the fallen French.

OPERATION NATHAN HALE

25 June 1966 - 3 July 1966

On the 25th of June at 1700, the battalion received a verbal Warning

Order from Headquarters, 2nd Brigade for deployment in the last phase of Operation Nathan Hale in the vicinity of Tuy Hoa in Phu Ten Province. Thus on the 26th the battalion was relieved of its highway responsibility and proceeded to Tuy Hoa via C-130 and CV-2 aircrafts closing by 0230 hours the morning of the 27th and immediately assumed the mission as the brigade reserve force.

For the next three days, the battalion moved out to its assigned sector and carried out company sized search and clear operations. During part of this time Bravo Company was under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry and Charlie secured Battery B of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery. In general there was little enemy contact. Bravo and Alpha Companies located training, resting and staging areas, in addition to an old hospital area. Alpha had the only major contact with the enemy when they took 20 to 30 VC under fire and pursued the groups to the northeeast and later suffered 4 WIA from a mine field.

The 30th day of June found the battalion alerted for possible committment in a search for a radio station, but the station proved to be too
elusive. The enemy had made major contact with the 1st Cavalry Division
prior to the "Chargers" entering the operation but had broken up into small
groups to exfiltrated the area by the time the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry
was committed and thus the battalion engaged in no major actions.

INTRODUCTION

1 July 1966 - 31 December 1966

The period of 1 July 1966 through 31 December 1966 found the "Chargers" fighting four major battles against numerically superior forces and coming out successful to varying degrees in all four encounters. During that period the battalion spent nine weeks manning the barrier at Camp Radcliff between combat operations. One of the stays on the barrier was spiced by a VC mortar attack of Camp Radcliff which the "Chargers" successfully repulsed by use of roving patrols outside the barrier. One unique facet of the battalion during this period was the July "turnover" which brought almost an entirely new crop of officers and enlisted men into the battalion. At times the rifle companies were operating at field strength of less than ninety men during the turnover, but the "Chargers" never missed a beat in carrying out their tactical missions.

This period saw the battalion fight what Division Commander, General John Norton, called the best victory the Cav has produced in Vietnam. The Battle of Hoa Hoi, fought on the coastal plains north of Qui Nhon on 2-3 October produced 141 enemy KIA by body count while the victorious "Chargers" suffered three killed. For their actions at Hoa Hoi, the "Chargers" were recommended for the Presidential Unit Citation. On 27 December 1966 at Landing Zone Bird, Sergeant Delbert O. Jennings, a squad leader in C Company, led that company's classic defense against a regiment of NVA and received recommendation for the Medal of Honor for his actions. This marked the first such recommendation to come out of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 12th Cavalry since the "Chargers" have been fighting in Vietnam.

The first day of July 1966 marked the 1st Air Cavalry Division's

1st anniversary as a reactivated unit and found the "Chargers" continuing
their search for the reported VC radio station transmitting in the Phu Yen

Province. With C Company doing most of the searching while the other companies
secured LZs and established ambushes, the battalion remained in the area
until 3 July when it commenced Operation Henry Clay in the same province.

OPERATION HENRY CLAY

3 July 1966 - 27 Jul 6 1966

On 4 July Company A air assaulted into LZ Bee to establish blocking positions in coordination with air strikes which were laid on for that afternoon in a cave-infested area nearby. The air strike flushed out approximately 20 VC which Company A pursued until dawn the following morning. In the scattered hit and run firefights Company A suffered five WIA. Enemy losses were not confirmed. On the afternoon of 7 July the battalion IRP received fire from three VC. The patrol returned fire and called in artillery. A search of the area uncovered an enemy recoilless rifle, but no bodies. The next day a Scout Blue Team attached to the battalion killed one VC and reported a large rice cache with several briefcases containing documents. On 10 July the battalion closed on LZ Jupiter for a 24 hour stand down during which they became the reaction force for the 1st Brigade. The following day, LTC James T. Root took command of the "Chargers" in a formal change of command ceremony at the landing zone. LTC Root moved his battalion out to LZ Silk on 12 July to begin new search and clear operations. From this lofty CP the battalion employed three IRPs along with the normal company size movements to scour as much of the rugged terrain as possible for VC activity. Two dars later B Company encountered three VC, killing two and wounding the other without suffering any friendly casualties. Search and clear operations continued in the area with very limited contact although both Compenies A and B found jungle hospital complexes and confiscated close to 100 pounds of supplies.

At 1810 hours on 18 July the battalion received orders to move west into Darlac Province in hopes of cutting off communist exfiltration near the Cambodian Border. Company A led the way assaulting into LZ Oak and

clearing it for the other companies. The approaching darkness and lack of logistical support to move the artillery nieces, however, forced D Company to remain at the old battalion CP until more ships became available the next morning to finish the move. Major Leon Rieri, who had joined the battalion that afternoon as the S-3 Officer, remained behind in charge of the former CP while LTC Root established new operations at LZ Oak. The following morning CPT Harold Fields and CPT James Barnett joined the battalion to take command of A and D Companies respectively. For one week the battalion carried out search and destroy operations in Darlac Province without any contact. The battalion then returned to Camp Radcliff on 27 July. After a two-day stand down, the individual companies air assaulted several kilometers outside of the barrier and patrolled that area for two days as a part of the early varning defensive system of Camp Radcliff.

OPERATION PAUL REVERE II

1 August 1966 - 14 August 1966

On 1 August the battalion was rushed with only 30 minutes notice to Pleiku Province where they immediately began taking part in Operation Paul Revere II near the Cambodian Border. LZ Blue, the battalion's CP location where A Company was poised in reserve, became a focal point of activity in that area for the next two days. On 1 August the battalion was alerted to move to the Chu Fong Mountain area to relieve two surrounded companies from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. TV cameramen and wire service reporters scrambled to LZ Blue to document Company A's assault into Chu Pong. Por risibility and lack of lift ships, however, postponed the assault until late that afternoon. The following morning this mission was reassigned to

another battalion. That night, however, the "Chargers" had their first significant contact during the period 1 July to 31 December. A platoon of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry air assaulted into LZ Pink several kilometers east of LZ Blue and was immediately hit and overrum by a reinforced NVA Company. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry immediately set out overland at dusk by individual platoons to relieve the badly mauled Cavalry unit. LT Joseph Anderson's 1st Platoon reached the beleaguered LZ after an all night march through the jungle and promptly engaged the superior enemy force with small arms and artillery support from two nearby landing zones. By dawn the enemy had withdrawn leaving behind four KIA and numerous packs and small arms. Artillery craters and numerous blood trails the next morning indicated that the enemy company took many more casualties than just those four KIA. The 1st Platoon of B Company suffered only two WIA in the battle.

The battalion remained in that area of Pleiku Province until 9 August when the battalion closed to secure the 3rd Frigade Headquarters at Oasis. The next day the battalion was released from 3rd Brigade OPCON and came under division control. On 14 August the battalion was relieved at Oasis and moved to Pleiku en route to An Khe where it assumed the defense of Camp Radcliff at 1400 bours on 15 August.

BARRIER DEFENSE

15 August 1966 - 12 September 1966

Immediately upon securing the barrier, the battalion dispatched its LRP, and each company sent out squad size recon elements to operate outside their sectors of the barrier as early warning devices and outer defensive positions. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry remained on 30 minute alert

as the battalion reaction force after the "Chargers" had relieved their sister 1st Brigade battalion on the barrier. Through the use of Trooper Teams, LRPs and attached dog teams, the battalion secured the perimeter with only very light enemy contact in the form of occasional sniperfire and punji stake wounds. On the night of 26 August a patrol from Company C reported seeing three pajama clad VC carrying weapons; one was killed. This is the same area where earlier that evening an element of C Company had been receiving automatic weapons fire. On 30 August, the 5th Pattalion, 7th Cavalry, newly arrived in Vietnam from Ft. Carson, Cola, made its first training mission in the form of platoon size patrols in the B-Ring outside of the barrier. Platoon leaders from the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavilry acted as advisers to the new combat platoons. Defensive operations outside the barrier continued as usual until the night of 3 September when basecamp reported receiving incoming mortar rounds, later estimated to be approximately forty rounds. SP4 Terry Frazier (Company B), who was leading a six man security patrol 500 meters outside the barrier, spotted the muzzle flashes of the enemy mortars nearby and engaged the platoon size enemy force with small arms fire and artillery support from Camp Radcliff. The enemy quickly broke contact and withdrew to the northwest. A company from the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry was air assaulted into the area around midnight but was unable to make contact with the fleeing enemy force. The patrol from B Company found three 82mm mortar rounds, four mortar firing positions, ten ammunition carrying baskets and several sets of aiming stakes in the area the following morning. There was no further enemy contact in the TAOR the next three days. On 6 September the "Chargers" were relieved on the barrier by the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. After a one day stand down, the battalion

was moved into the souther portion of the TAOR below Highway 19 where its mission was to insure safe passage along the highway and prevent any vo terrorism tactics around An Khe during the upcoming 11 September general election. Companies A, B and D saturated the area with patrols for the four-day period while Company C remained in base camp under OFCON of the 3rd Brigade as reserve/reaction force for defense of Camp Radcliff.

Although there were scattered reports of small bands of VC supposedly roaming the outskirts of An Khe during the election period, the next four days passed without serious incident. Company B killed one VC carrying an AK 47 on 10 September, but no other enemy contact was made while the "Chargers" were deployed in the TAOR. On 12 September the battalion returned to base camp to prepare for their next combat operation which would begin the following day with a two pronged air assault into the mountains near the coastal plains northwest of Qui Nhon.

OPERATION THAYER I

13 September 1966 - 1 October 1966

The objective of Operation Thayer I was to attempt to engage the 18th NVA Regiment off guard in its backyard, the Kim Son Valley, where it was anticipated that the unit would withdraw for rest and recuperation following a series of terror tactics in the populated lowlands during the Vietnamese General Election period. Company A air assaulted into LZ Mike while B Company and part of D Company air assaulted into LZ Duz and secured it for the battalion CP. Because of bad weather, Company C and EHC (-) were short-circuited to LZ Hammond that night and joined the remainder of the battalion the next day when the weather lifted. For the next few days the battalion began clearing to the east, finding traces of recent enemy activity in the

area and receiving almost daily sniperfire from stay-behind enemy forces. On 18 September Company A reported what appeared to have recently been a battalion size bivouac area where they found a l_{L}^{\perp} -ton rice cache along with 40 refugees who were treated by CPT Edward Wagner, the battalion surgeon, before being evacuated by the 1st Brigade Civil Affairs team. The "Chargers" continued moving and leap-frogging in a generally eastward direction finding further signs of recent NVA activity in each area they cleared. On 20 September Company A found a company sized bivouac area with expended shells, recoilless rifle rounds, gas masks and medical supplies. Commany A killed one VC who walked into the bivouac area while they were searching it and fired on his four comrades who fled through the underbrush. The same afternoon Company C uncovered a VC hospital and supply hootch along with two recent graves as they tracked down a small band of enemy. Company C set up a perimeter that night around the hospital and received probing fire most of the night, but had no further contact the next morning. On 21 September Company A killed a VC supply representative but suffered three WIA later the same day from enemy booby traps. Company C was extracted and air landed to the southeast that afternoon and found four recently booby trapped huts. For the next ten days each of the compenies continued uncovering booby-traps, rice and amounition caches, bunker systems and small bands of stay behind forces. It became evident after 2 weeks of exhaustive searching in the Kim Son Valley that the main force of the 18th Regiment had not returned to its stomping grounds as predicted. Fased on intelligence reports that the unit was operating in force in the heavily populated coastal lowlands to the east, Operation Thayer I was temporarily suspended while the 1st Brigade, along with the Korean and ARVN forces, could move to clear this coastal area. The new operation was called "Irving". In addition to producing the decisive

victory at Hoa Hoi, the operation furnished Non-Communist forces with more military prisoners than any other operation to date in the Republic of Vietnam.

OPERATION INVING

2 October 1966 - 24 October 1966

The operation was less than six hours old on the morning of 2 October when advance scout teams from the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry reported two helicopters shot down near the village of Hoa Hoi. Immediately, Company B, which was airborne on another mission at the time, was diverted and air assaulted into the beach east of the suspected enemy village. Moments off the landing zone, the company began receiving fire from the village.

Company A was rushed into the area southwest of the village as soon as helicopters became available. After Companies A and B had established initial contact with the enemy, the battalion withheld its fire while a psychological operations helicopter circled the village with loudspeakers directing the civilians to move out of the area and imploring the soldiers to lay down their arms. During the moratorium, numerous civilians and soldiers did as they were directed by the loudspeaker. When it became evident an hour later that no one else was coming out, the "Chargers" began moving in.

A and B Companies continued to press the attack from the south while C Company assaulted into the northern outskirts of Hoa Hoi and began moving down to meet them. The battalion, CP, with D Company in reserve, moved to LZ Irene on a ridgeline approximately 4000 meters from the battle. With the approach of nightfall, two companies from the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry were air assaulted into the area to complete the encirclement of the village until the final attack could be launched the next morning. At daybreak on

3 October Companies A and B braced themselves in blocking positions around the southern half of the village while Company C began attacking south through the enemy positions. The bunkers and extensive trench system favored the North Vietnamese defensive posture and made C Company's advance extremely difficult. Several times C Company was temporarily stopped, but each time the soldiers rallied and, by individual combat at point blank range, drove on through the village. By noon of that day when B and C Companies completed their final sweep of the village and began screening the area to the south of Hoa Hoi, the "Chargers" had left in their wake 141 enemy KIA by actual body count. Later intelligence reports estimated the enemy death total at approximately two hundred. The "Chargers" captured 35 NVA soldiers and detained 15 VCS. In the 24-hour battle, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 12th Cavalry suffered three KIA and 29 WIA.

For the next six days the battalion alternately swept and blocked its way back south toward landing zone Hammond where the 1st Brigade had scheduled a special awards ceremony and one day stand down for the battalion of 9 October. During this six day period the individual companies continued finding evidence of enemy activity in the area (i.e.—foxholes, rice and arms caches, makeshift hospitals and litters, booby traps and expended casings.) The only physical contacts came on 6 October when C Company suffered one KIA and the following afternoon when they killed one VC.

On 9 October the entire battalion closed on LZ Hammond where General Norton was present to praise the "Chargers" for their victory at Hoa Hoi and pin medals on five individuals as a token tribute to the battalion's fine victory. He presented Silver Stars to Sp4 Michael Caldwell (B Company) and PFC Franklin Donaldson (A Company). The Division Commander then pinned Bronze Stars with "V" Devices on LTC Root (Battalion CO), Sp4 Martin Murry

(B Company), and Sp4 David Osborne (C Company). Following the presentation of the medals, General Norton addressed the men of the battalian and concluded his remarks by saying, "This division has won big many times, but we have never won better than we did at Hoa Hoi."

Following the one day stand down at LZ Hammond, the battalion took up the mission of securing key landing zones in the division's AO while serving as the division reaction force. Initially Company A secured LZ Crystal; B Company secured the new Phu Cat Airfield; and Company C defended the Division CP at Phu Cat. The battalion remained in basically this same posture for the next twelve days securing the key support bases in the populous areas northwest of Qui Mhon. On the 23rd of October the battalion closed on LZ Hammond again for a change of command ceremony in which LTC Root turned the "Charger" reins over to LTC George D. Eggers Jr., formerly Commandante of the 1st Cavalry Division's Replacement Training Center.

Before the change of command ceremony, General Norton pinned the Silver Star on LTC Root, replacing the interimly awarded Pronze Star w'"V""earned for his actions at Hoa Hoi. General Norton then announced that LTC Root would become the G-3 Officer of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

OPERATION MORTH

25 October 1966 - 29 October 1966

For the next three days the battalion integrity was broken down with Companies A and D under OPCON of the 3rd Brigade and Company C under OPCON to the 1st Scuadron, 9th Cavalry. Company P remained OPCON to the 1st Brigade. Companies A and D conducted Cordon and Search mission during the day and returned to securing LZs at night. On 25 October Company C killed one VC and captured three weapons before closing on Phu Cat. The companies remained

in position until 28 October when Company A and the Recon Platoon conducted Operation North, a 36 hour Show-of-Force in the LZ English area designed to confuse the NVA in that area and deter their anticipated attack on the ARWI force securing that position. The show-of-force, a coordinated operation involving the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry (-), 40th ARVE Regiment, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery, 227th Assault Helicopter Eattalion, an ARVN artillery battery and U.S. naval gun support, commenced at 0630 hours on 28 October with Company A making the first of three air movements during the day. After the ARVF force had made an assault, the 227th AHB had made several mock assault flights overhead and US and AHVN artillery units had pounded the suspected enemy emplacement, psychological warfare helicopters circled over the bewildered NVA blaring out various "surrender" themes. This show-of-force so successfully confused the enemy as to the real strength and intentions of allied forces in the area that the MVA did not mount their attack on LZ English as reliable intelligence sources had indicated the were prepared to do. During the 36-hour operation friendly forces combined to inflict 24 KIA and 2 known WIA on the enemy.

BARRIER DEFENSE

30 October 1966 - 12 December 1966

On 29 October all companies with the exception of Company A closed on Camp Radcliff to assume defense of the barrier the next day. At 0900 hours on 30 October, Companies B, C and D took over the defense of Camp Radcliff.

Company A, which had been held at Hammond under OPCON of the 1st Brigade, closed on base camp early that evening but was alerted to be ready to move out the nest morning to support the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry. The following morning Alpha did just that, supporting the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry

in Pleiku Province until they were released to join the rest of the battalion on the barrier on 9 November. During the ten days that E, C and D Companies secured Camp Radcliff without serious incident, one or more platoons from the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry was on constant 30 menute alert as a reaction force for the "Chargers".

On 10 November the "Chargers" began implementing a new defensive concept outside the barrier. The new defensive measure, a single strand wire strung all the way around Camp Radcliff at maximum effective 82mm mortar range from the golf course, provided friendly patrols with a physical boundary for their movement on the ground and thus provided supporting artillery batteries with an immediate and safe "quick-fire" zone in the event base camp came under attack. Pre-designated LZs were backed out at various points along the wire which greatly reduced the reaction time of reserve forces moving to contact an enemy force outside the barrier.

To further supplement defense of the barrier, the "Chargers" initiated photographic range cards for each tower. This painstaking project, when it was completed the first week in December, provided each tower leader with a marked panoramic picture of his area of responsibility. By comparing his target on the ground with the marked photograph in his tower even a novice rifleman could call in accurate pre-fired artillery concentrations on the enemy in a minimum of time.

The surprisingly long stay on the barrier (approximately 6 weeks) gave the battalion a chance to catch up on its Civil Affairs and Base Development projects. CPT Robert Hermanutz worked diligently with the inhabitants of refugee villages Tan Phong "A", Tan Phong "B" and Hoi An. Through a series of public letters to hometown newpapers, he elicited the aid of American

families who donated clothes, toys and foodstuffs to the VIIIagers. During the last part of 1966 the "Charger" S-5 team held weekly sick calls in these villages treating an average of forty patients on each trip. CPT Hermanutz took a gigantic step in improving the refugees' personal hygeine habits by building and delivering the first screened—in latrice to the village of Tan Phong "A".

In the meantime LT William Crow, the battalion base development officer, had his R & U detail working just as diligently to build housing for the "Radcliff Refugees". By the time the "Chargers" departed base camp on 12 December to take part in Operation Thayer II, there were eight permanent barracks and one permanent BOQ standing in the battalion area. There were many more to come, plus plans for a central running-water system which LT Crow conceived and began work on.

One of the primary tactical missions taking place during this relatively peaceful six-week period was the conversion of D Company from a general support company to a light rifle company with three rifle platoons. The company trained outside the barrier for five days the second week in December before making the conversion.

General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of Allied Forces in Vietnam, visited the 1st Team on 6 December and spoke to the men of the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry at the Division Bowl. He then received a briefing there by LTC Eggers on the defense of Camp Radcliff. Four days later, General Morton paid the battalion a visit to present medals to fifteen "Chargers" who had distinguished themselves in Operation Irving. In what must have been the largest battalinn size decorations ceremony since the division has been in Vietnam, General Norton pinned five Silver Stars and ten Bronze Stars with "V" Devices on deserving "Chargers" while the battalion looked on proudly.

The awards ceremony wrapped up the pateation a doubtleton in the provided a fitting send-off to the "Chargers" as they prepared to enter the second phase of Operation Thayer.

OPERATION THAYER II

12 December 1966 - 31 December 1966

On 12 December the battalian set out by land and air to the rice-rich Thayer II operational area northwest of Qui Nhon. The mission was to search and clear the fertile Highway 506 and Kim Son Valleys and deny those areas to the enemy. The battalian's first three weeks in Thayer II would prove the most costly fighting period for the "Chargers" since their arrival in the Republic of Vietnam. In the two battles of 17 December and 27 December, the battalian suffered 44 KIA. Enemy casualties for those two battles were much greater, but this offered small consolation to the "Chargers" who had just two months earlier killed 200 enemy at Hoa Hoi while losing only three men.

The operation began with A Commany convoying to LZ Hammond and the other three companies flying there for further deployment. Commany B then flew to LZ Pony; Company C to Bird; Company D to LZ Meade; and Company A to LZ Black. The battalion CP set up at LZ Pony where it remained until February. Under direction of COL James Smith, the new brigade commander, the "Chargers" found themselves operating in smaller, more widely dispersed elements throughout the NVA infested valley complex. COL Smith, a former commander of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, utilized the Cavalry techniques of extensive mobility and quick reaction to cover as much of the densely vegetated area as possible in a minimum of time. The individual companies shuffled back and forth from LZ to LZ trying to make contact with the VC and

the 18th NVA Regiment suprosedly operating in the area. Several IRPs began reporting light contact from the time the battalion opened operations in the area. On 15 December the 2nd Platoon of B Company brought a squad size VC force under fire, wounding two and pursuing the blood trails down a draw which the 3rd Platoon had blocked 1000 meters ahead. Joined by the 4th Flatoon, the 2nd Platoon of B Company pushed forward shoulder to shoulder toward the 3rd Flatoon's position. In the ensuing battle B Company killed two VC by body count without suffering any casualties. The next day Company C killed another VC and captured a 60mm mortar baseplate. That night Company B was moving through the jungle when a small band of VC fell into line behind them. The rear security guard immediately turned his rifle on the enemy fully automatic when he realized he was being followed. He killed one and wounded the other VC who was taken as a prisoner.

The next morning at 1003 hours a platonn of Company C, 1st Eattalion, 8th Cavalry reported contact with an estimated squad size VC element east of Thach Long 1 in the Highway 506 Valley. As the platoon continued developing the battle, the estimated size of the enemy force increased to a platoon and then to a company. A 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Apache Cavalry team lifted into the area and immediately came under fire. The 2nd Flatoon of Company C air assaulted into the area at 0110 hours from its reaction position at LZ Bird. The entire 3 Company of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry displaced into the Thach Long area at 1128 hours from LZ Fony. The discovery of a battalion size switchboard in the area forced the friendly unit to reevaluate the enemy's strength in the village. At this point one LRF and an Apache Team from the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry reported they were surrounded by enemy in other parts of the valley. The "Chargers", who were dispersed throughout the neighboring Kim Son valley in company size and smaller elements,

were elerted to move to the nearest pick up zones for airlifts to the battle area. In the meantime, Company B, 1st Fattalion, 8th Cavalry was airborne to the area from LZ Hammond. By 1600, Company A, Company C and two platoons of Company D were on the ground north of the enemy village making their way slowly south through intense enemy fire. Company B reinforced behind them an hour later. As the battle progressed it became evident that there was at least one reinforced, and possibly two, well entrenched enemy battalions in the village. The battle raged violently until well into the night with casualties mounting on both sides. LT Chester Cox, acting CO of D Company, became the first KIA in the Charger Officer Corps in nine months. When the village was finally cleared the next morning, the "Chargers" had suffered 30 killed. Enemy KIAs were estimated at eighty.

The battalion spent the next two days screening the area and calling in TAC air support on suspected enemy concentrations. The individual companies found numerous bunkers and recently killed VC bodies. Most of the kills were credited to the Highway 506 Valley battle and the air strikes.

Villagers in the area reported seeing enemy troops pulling back with numerous wounded men. On 20 December, Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, which was OFCON to the "Chargers", spotted a company size enemy element moving before daybrack. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry was lifted into the area to help engage the enemy. Air strikes were called into the area. When the two 1st Brigade companies swept the valley they found 14 enemy bodies.

For the next four days the battalion continued search and blocking operations south of the Crow's Foot looking for the large enemy force reportedly still in that area. During that period friendly forces reported 13 enemy KIA. The battalion did not suffer any KIAs during these skiraishes. Fowever, the flash floor's which deluged the valley claimed the lives of two "Chargers"

who drowned on 23 December conducting clearing sperations near IZ Bird.

At 0700 hours on 24 December the Christmas Cease-Fire Truce went into effect. The enemy obviously used this time to maneuver his forces into better position for a post-truce attack which was rumored imminent. Late Christmas afternoon an L-19 observation aircraft spotted approximately 150 pajama-clad, weapon-carrying soldiers who scattered when the plane flew overhead.

On 26 December each company sent two men into base camp to attend the Bob Hope Show at the Division Bowl. Although rain threatened to cancel the show, some 2000 Cavalrymen crammed the Division Bowl hill to get a look at Home and his troup. Mostly it was his troup of Miss World, Joy Heatherton and Anita Bryant who drew most of the attention once the show got underway an hour late. The "Chargers" painted a large "1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Welcomes Bob Hope" sign in the battalion area which attracted the eye of the TV Cameraman. The Bob Hope Show provided a much needed relief from the rigors of war for the Cavalrymen. But less than 12 hours later the reality of the Vietnam War came crashing back to the men of the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry.

On the night of the 26th, the 22nd NVA Regiment, which had used the Christmas cease-fire period to mass its troops north of the Kim Son Valley, moved in under the cover of darkness and a noisy rain to surround Landing Zone Bird where C Company (-) was defending two artillery batteries. At OlO5 hours the enemy kicked off its savage mortar and ground attack on the eighty-four "Charger" defenders at LZ Bird. LT Jerald Wallace moved to the point bunker and directed that position's desperate stand against the Communist human wave until he was mortally wounded. The acting CO, LT John Rieke, was seriously wounded early in the battle, leaving LT Charles

Campanella, the company FO, as the only fuctioning officer in C Campany.

Much of the slack was taken up by SGT Delbert Jennings and PSG Company. Much of the slack was taken up by SGT Delbert Jennings and PSG Company. The badly outnumbered "Chargers" fought valiantly and gave their ground grudgingly as the artillerymen to their rear prepared their guns to fire direct fire into the oncoming enemy. After fighting numerous delaying actions, the "Chargers" were backed into a tiny perimeter around the last 105 howitzer position where they and the artillerymen lought a classic last stand against the frantically charging enemy. The artillery fired two rounds of "Bee Hive" into the Communist wave and broke the back of the enemy assault. Then, with Sp4 David Osborne standing on top of a bunker firing his machinegun John Wayne style from the hip into the enemy, the "Chargers" began their counter—attack which cleared the LZ of NVA insurgents.

The 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry suffered fourteen KIA. Enemy losses were estimated at 165 KIA. Although the captured enemy operations officer who planned the attack called it, "a disasterous defeat," the "Chargers" finished 1966 and began the new year unusually bitter. For the next four days they scoured the operation area finding more enemy bodies believed dragged from LZ Bird. Company A closed out the contact for 1966 killing 5 VC while suffering only one WIA on 29 December.

GLOSSARY and ABBREVIATIONS

£	10	Area of Operations
f	AR4	Aerial Rocket Artillery
ŀ	ARVN	Army Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnamese Regular Army
Í	AT Platoon	Anti-Tank Platoon
(CHICOM	Communist Chinese
(CIDG	Civil Irregular Defense Guard - similar to the US National Guard
(CS Gas	A very effective Tear Gas
ì		Forward Observer - An officer or NCO who adjusts supporting fires
1	FSE	Forward Support Element
1	Hi.G	Heavy Machinegun
J	LIA	Killed In Action
1	LMG	Light Machinegun
]	LNO	Liason Officer - An officer who maintains contact and intercommunications between different units to insure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action
1	IRP	Long Range Patrol - Usually consisting of from 4 - 7 EMs who are self sufficient for periods of up to 3 days and perform missions as stay behind forces, recon patrols and ambush patrols
1	LZ	Landing Zone - The area where an air assault is made or the area where troops are unloaded from helicopters
1	Main Force Unit	A North Vietnamese Regular Army Unit

Man Trap	Any large camouflaged trap, i.e. pit with sharpened stakes or splites but back on a wip limber
MIA	Missing In Action
Nontagnard	A mountain tribe or series of tribes who do not speak Vietnamese nor resemble them
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam - Hard Core North Vietnamese Regulars
Puff the Magic Dragon	A CH-47 aircraft, equipped with a Minnie gun which fires 6000 20mm rounds per minute and is capable of substained time over the target
Punji Stake	A slender pointed stake (usually made of bamboo) occasionally tipped with poison, which is stuck into the ground at an angle with the point up thusly inflicting a wound to all who press against it
Psychological War Team	A special team usually headed by a Special Forces NCO consisting of Viet-namese and Montagnard interpreters equipped with loud speakers and pamphlets plus a small security element.
FZ	Pick Up Zone - In open area where air- craft in flight may approach the ground to receive messages, other aircraft and personnel or supplies
RL	Rocket Launcher
RR	Recoilless Rifle
RRU	Radio Research Unit
Smokey the Bear	A flare ship capable of substained time over the target
Sertie	An operational flight by one aircraft
Strike	An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize or destroy an objective

TAC air	Tactical Air - In this case meaning that tactical Air Force aircraft were being called in for a strike
TACR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
Troop Ladder	A complex rope ladder slung from a CH-47 (Chinook Helicopter) used to raise troops to the aircraft when landing on the ground is impossible
Tube Artillery	Ground or Conventional Artillery
VC	Viet Cong
VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VCS	Viet Cong Suspect
WIA	Vounded In Action

KEY PERSONNEL

NAME	JOB TITLE
LTC Rutland D. Beard Jr.	Bn CO
LTC James T. Root	Bn CO
LTC George D. Eggers Jr.	En CO
LTC Otto L. Cantrall	Bn XO
MAJ Robert J. Thomas MAJ Louis C. Bryan Jr.	Bn XO Bn XO
MAJ William C. Roll	S-3
MAJ Leon D. Bieri	S-3
CPT Jackie B. Cummings	S-1; CO Co A
CPT Johnie L. Daniel	S-1
CPT Phillip L. Blake	S-1; CO Co A
CPT Harold T. Fields Jr.	S-1; CO Co A
CPT Cyrus R. Steimert	S-2
CPT Michael W. Maxwell	S-2; CO HHC
CPT Roy Benson Jr.	S-2; CO Co B
CPT William A. Scott	S-2
CPT John P. Castro	S-3 Air; CO HHC
CPT Robert E. Lindquist	S-3 Air; CO Co C
CPT Herbert J. Glazer	S-3 Air; XO Co A
CPT John G. Gergulis	S-4
CPT Paul E. Boardingham	S-4
CPT Richard Jenkins	S-5; CO HHC
CPT Robert J. Hermanutz	S-5; Med Plt Ldr
CPT Ted A. Showalter	Commo Officer
CPT Robert D. Sturdivant	Commo Officer; XO Co D
CPT Lorenzo M. Doss	Commo Officer; CO Co C
CPT Harry D. Heidman	Bn Surgeon
CPT Edward H. Wagner	Bn Surgeon
CPT Billy Lord	Bn Chaplain
CPT Jack Keene	Bn Chaplain LNO
CPT Wayne C. Davis	LNO; XO Co A
LT Danny R. Byard LT Jimmie R. Smith	LNO; XO Co B
LT Melvin A. Estey	LNO; Med Plt Ldr
LT Emmett Y. Burton	LNO
CPT Charlie Wurzbacher	LNO; XO Co D; Plt Ldr Co A
LT Gordon J. Fardal	LNO; XO and Plt Ldr Co A
LT Allan R. Becker	LNO; XO and Plt Ldr Co C; Plt Ldr Co A
LT Grover C. Robinson III	LNO; Plt Ldr Co A
LT William H. Crow	LNO; XO and Plt Ldr Co B
CPT Roland R. Parr	CO HHC; CO Co C
CPT John E. Drake	CO Co A
LT Lawrence Britton	XO Co A
LT Joseph Rosario	XO and Plt Ldr Co A; S&T Plt Ldr
LT Robert D. Robbins	XO and Plt Ldr Co A
LT Donald B. Adamson	Plt Ldr Co A
LT Daniel J. Kapica	Plt Ldr Co A
LT Joseph H. Snyder	Plt Ldr Co A and Co C
LT Donald E. Grigg	Plt Ldr Co A and Co D

Fit Ldr vo A LT William F. Pritchard Plt Idr Co A LT Joseph Ontiveras CO Co B CPT Stephen Klein LT George Quigley LT Joseph B. Anderson Jr. XO Co B XO and Plt Idr Co B LT David R. Poore XO and Plt Ldr Co B LT Authur L. West Plt Ldr Co B IT Roger V. Baker Plt Ldr Co B LT Donald B. Epstein LT Lewis C. Anderson Pla Ldr Co B and Co D Plt Idr Co B; S&T Plt Idr Plt Idr Co B LT Walter Crimmins Jr. Plt Ldr Co B; XO HHC LT Donald E. Parnell CO Co C CPT Donald F. McMillan CO Co C and Co D CPT Donald F. Warren CPT Darrell G. Houston CO Co C XO Co C LT Michael T. Chase LT John M. Rieke LT Robert McClellan XO Co C Plt Idr Co C LT Donald Kell Plt Idr Co C Plt Idr Co C LT Fred Simon LT John H. Rudd LT Jerald D. Wallace Plt Idr Co C Plt Idr Co C LT William R. Edmison Plt Idr Co C LT Louis Strovas Plt Ldr Co C CPT Robert T. Adams CO Co D CO Co D OT James R. Barnett LT Robert Peel XO Co D LT Chester Cox LT Paul R. Prindle XO Co D XO and Plt Idr Co D Plt Idr Co D LT Roger Carpenter LT John C. Chappelle Plt Idr Co D LT Timothy Feener LT Roger N. Conner Plt Lar Co D Plt Idr Co D; S&T Plt PBO CWO George B. Callahan PBO CWO Donald V. McLernon Bn SMJ SMJ Felix Lubiszewski \$MJ John Pearce Bn SMJ HHC 1SG Alfred A. Daniels ISG William H. Colbert Co A Co A ISG Charles R. Hillis Co B 1SG Clarence Linton 1SG James Evans Co B Co C 1SG William C. Staton Co C 1SG Vincent A. Provost Co D 1SG William M. Tucker 1SG Gene O. Helgeson Co D Bn Opns MSG Richard E. Sandlin Bn Opns 'MSG John O. Corzot MSG John M. Ketchum Bn Opns MSG Leroy Mims Jr. Bn Intell Bn Intell MSG Don A. Edwards

ATTACK TO ARTILLERY PERSONNEL:

NAME:

OPT Robert D. Offer Jr.

OPT Jack Bell

OT John M. Sutton Jr.

LT Larry Winter LT Donald Taylor

LT Stephen K. Stout LT John D. Piper LT William Guerin

LT James Steinbacher

LT Carl Hubbard

LT Washington Sanchez LT Charles Campanella

JOB TITLE:

Fire Support Coordinator

Fire Support Coordinator

Fire Support Coordinator

FO Co A

FO Co A

FO Co A

FO Co B

FO Co B

FO Co B

FO Co C FO Co C

FO Co C

AWARD DECORATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Congressional Medal of Honor:	(1)	
JENNINGS, Delbert 0.		SGT
Distinguished Service Cross:	(3)	
BIERI, Leon D. HARRISON, Paul KENNEDY, Alton R.		MAJ PFC PFC
Silver Star:	(42)	
ROOT, James T. FIELDS, Harold T. Jr. HOUSTON, Darrell G. HOUSTOM, Darrell G. (1st OLC) MAYER, Frederick F. WAGNER, Edward H. WARREN, Donald F. CAMPANELIA, Charles COX, Chester G. GRIGG, Donald ONTIVERAS, Joseph WALLACE, Jerald HILLIS, Charles R. FRAZIER, Wesley JACKSON, Paul G. JOHNSON, Comar PERPETUA, Rogue AMBROSE, Warren HORTON, Floyd M. KIRBY, Robert BANAITIS. Donatis AHRAMS, Freddie CALDWELL, Michael ENNIS, James FOLEY, John R. GEDULICK, Thomas JACKSON, Norman JENKINS, Murry KIRKPATRICK, Ronald T. LAWRENCE, William MILLER, Errol OSBORNE, David PEASLEY, Gary SCMIDT, Richard SYLVIA, James WISELEY, William DONALDSON, Franklin LARSON, John G.		CPT CPT CPT CPT CPT CPT CPT CPT TILT 1LT 1LT 1LT 1LT 1LT 1LT 1SG PSG SGT SP5 SP4

Silver Star (Cont):		
MACK, Robert L. POTTER, Donald ROYAL, Francis STINSON, George		PFC PFC PFC
Soldier's Medal: (3)		
HOLDER, Lawrence SMITH, Robert WHITE, Ulysses		PFC PFC
<u>Legion of Merit:</u> (1)		
BEARD, Rutland D.		LTC
Bronze Star with "V" device: (104)		
EGGERS, George D. Jr. CANTRALL, Otto L. BUERI, Leon D. ROLL, William C. THOMAS, Robert J. BLAKE, Phillip L. FIEIDS, Harold T. Jr. GERGULIS, John G. KLEIN, Stephen LINDQUIST, Robert E. SUTTON, John M. CAMPANELLA, Charles CHASE, Michael PRITCHARD, William F. RIEKE, John L. ROBBINS, Robert D. RUDD, John STOUT, Stephen K. STOUT, Stephen K. (1st OLC) WALLACE, Jerald BAKER, Roger V. KAPICA, Daniel PEARCE, John COLBER, William H. HILLIS, Charles R. BOWMAN, Robert R. BRADLY, Riley A. ERNEST, Willie		LTC MAJ MAJ MAJ CPT CPT CPT LLT LLT LLT LLT LLT LLT LLT LLT LT LLT
HAYES, Ernest LATHAM, James LEEMHUIS, Donald PERPETUA, Rogue ANDERSON, Ronald T. CATO, William C.		PSG PSG PSG PSG SSG SSG
######################################	59	

Bronze Star with "V" device (Cont):

T.	SPINOSA, Ellis		SSG
	REATHOUSE, Julius		SSG
	ALL, John		SSG
	ENNINGS, Delbert O.		SSG
	ORRIS, James C.		SSG
N	ORMAN, Joseph L.		SSG
S	INKOVÍTZ, John F.		SSG
H	ALL, Jerome		SP6
B	ATTLE, Herman		SGT
B	RYANT, Paul		SGT
C	OOK, William D.		SGT
D	EHNERT, Edward		SGT
	ETCO, Dennis		SGT
	ARCIA, Antonio		SGT
	RIGGS, John		SGT
	AMBRIGHT, James M.		SGT
	UTE, Harry G.		SGT
S	ALAZAR, Robert		SGT
S	KIPPER, Hugh		SGT
W	ARREN, Donald F.		SGT
L	OWDEN, Charles		SP5
S	MITH, Albert		SF5
	ANAITIS, Donatis		SFL
	AYLOR, Arthur		SF4
	OODLEMAN, Charles		SPL
	RATTIS, Robert		SPL
	RYANT, Milton		SPL
	ASTOR, Stepen E.		SF4
	HANEY, Daryl		SP4
	OCRUM, Larry		SPL
	EATON, Jack		SFL
	RDOS, Dennis		SFL
	AMILTON, Donald		SFL
	ILL, Lucious O.		SF4
	OBBS, Thomas D.		SP4
J	ENKINS, Murry		SPL
	OHNS ON, Ronald		SP4
	IRBY, Robert		SPL
K	NEREL, Charles W.	*	SPL
	EE, Frederico		Sil
			SFL
, ,	EVA, James		SPL
1	JISK, Gary S.		SPL
ľ	WRRY, Martin		SP 4
	IORMAN, Joseph		SP4
	SBORNE, David		SP4
	ARENT, Arthur H.		SP4
	ANCHEZ, Arcadio		SP4
5	BANCHEZ, James		024

Bronze Star with "V" device (Cont):

SPRANZA, John S. Jr.	SP4
SHUBERT, Daniel	SPh
WALKER, Ricky	SP4
ANDERSON, Michael	PFC
CAROTHERS, Richard	PFC
CLIFTON, John	PFC
DEAN, Curtis	PFC
GOODEAGIE, Percy	PFC
HAMILTON, Michael	PFC
HERNANDEZ, Jose R.	PFC
JENKINS, Delbert	PFC
LUNA, Angel	PFC
MASSEY, Shirrell	PFC
McDONALD, Michael W.	PFC
MORRIS, Jack H.	PFC
MORRIS, Jack H. (1st OLC)	PFC
OLZAK, Raymond	PFC
PERRY, Joseph	PFC
	PFC
SALAZAR, Roy	PFC
SWANSON, Gerald	PFC
TASSIER, Aaron	
VAN DYNE, John	PFC

Bronze Star (Meritorious): (67)

CANTRALL, Otto	LTC
BIERI, Leon D.	MAJ
BRYAN, Louis	MAJ
ROLL, William C.	MAJ
CASTRO, John P.	CF T
CUMMINGS, Jackie	CPT
FIEIDS, Harold T. Jr.	OPT.
GERGULIS, John G.	CP T
GLAZER, Herbert	CPT.
HOUSTON, Darrell G.	CPT
KLEIN, Stephen	OPT.
LINDQUIST, Robert E.	CPT
MacMILLIAN, Donald F.	CPT
MAXWELL, Michael	CPT
OFFO, Robert	T ^D
ANDERSON, Lewis C.	1LT
BECKER, Allan	1LT
CHASE, Michael	lLT
CONNER, Roger N.	lLT
CROW, William H.	llt
DAVIS, Wayne L.	llt
GRIGG, Donald	1LT
McIELLAN, Robert W.	llt
PEEL, Robert D.	llT
POORE David	lLT

Bronze Star (Meritorious) (Cont):

i i		
QUIGLEY, George		lLT
CALLAHAN, George		CM2
LUBISZEWSKI, Felix		SGM
COZORT, John		MSG
DANIELS, Alfred E.		1SG
STATON, William R.		lsG
DIXON, Ralph		SFC
MILISTEAD, Richard		SFC
BRADIEY, Riley		PSG
DIXON, David		PSG
KRAFT, Frederick		PSG
MARQUEZ, Gonzales		PSG
PERPETUA, Rogue		PSG
REZNICER, Rudolf		PSG
SINKOVITZ, John		FSG
TURNER, Edward D.		PSG
ANDERSON, Ronald T.		SSG
COULBY, Howard		SSG
EDWARDS, James W.		SSG
GULLY, Sherman		SSG
JOHNSON, Melvin		SSG
MORTON, James		SSG
MUNAR, Antonio		SSG
MUNIZ, Hurelio		SSG
O'Dell, Frank		SSG
TUCKER, L. G.		SSG
WHITE, Davd		SSG
WISE, John F.		SSG
ALI, Wilbur		SGT
HACHEZ, Joseph		SGT
HAMMETT, Harold		SGT
LOWE, Donald		SGT
MARSHALL, Oscar		SGT
McKelvey, William B.		SGT
MURRAY, Abraham		SGT
THORMILL, Francis		SGT
WARREN, Donald F.		SGT
WHEELER, Brad		SP5
BANAITIS, Donatis		SP4
GASSMAN, Walter		SP4
LINEMAN, Ronald L.		SP4
LONG, Thomas K.		SP4
Army Commendation Medal with "V" device:	(26)	
	ž. Š	

HARVELL, Kenneth	OPT.
WAGNER, Edward H.	CPT
STOUT. Stephen	llT
JUREK, Darvin	PSG
MAROUES-GONZALES, Alejae	SSG

Army Commendation Medal with "V" device (Cont):

BLUE, Henry			SGT
COOPER, Marion			SGT
STEPHENS, Jesse			SGT
QUINN, James M.			SGT
BERNAL, Gregorio			SPh
BRAGA, James L.			SP4
CARTER, Gary			SP4
CRUM, William			SP4
FRAZIER, Terry			SPL
HOBBS, Thomas			SPL
HOSIER, Thomas			SPL
KARNES, Thomas E.			SP4
POU, Ronald E.			SF4
SINGLETON, Wilbur			SP4
SMITH, Leland			SP4
STENSKE, Robert E.			SPL
THACH, Billy J.			SP4
BUCKAIEW, Charles			PFC
CHISHOLM, Howard		6	PFC
McCoy, Michael			PFC
SOBEL, Michael			PFC
,			
Army Commendation Medal:	(67)		
	(01)		
ROLL, William C.			MAJ
GERGULIS, John G.		H.	OPT
HEIDEMAN, Harry D.			OPT.
KIEIN, Stephen			OPT.
LINDQUIST, Robert E.			CPT
STURDIVANT, Robert D.			OP T
ESTEY, Melvyn A. Jr.			lLT
McCIELLAN, Robert			1LT
MOSES, Robert E.			lLT
BURTON, Emmitt Y.			2LT
CALLAHAN, George B.			CW2
LINTON, Clarence			1SG
HATCHER, Joseph F.			SFC
ELLIS, Charles			PSG
PERPETUA, Rogue			PSG
ALI, Wilbur			SSG
HOLMES, Edward			SSG
Mc CAIL, R.L.			SSG
PEREZ_SOTO, Julio			SSG
SAMPSON, Booker			SSG
SCARLETT, James L.			SSG
THEILING, A.M.			SSG
(이번 12의 전로 제공하는 12의 개의 투명하고 1 1 2의 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			SGT
ALEZANDER, Norman			SGT
ARNOID, Dieter G.			SGT
CAIDERON, Robert L. CAIDWELL, Joe L.			SGT
			SGT
COLON, Victor		63	

Army Commendation Medal (Cont):

DIACONESCU, Petru	8.60	SGT
FETO, Dennis		SGT
GRIFFITH, David C		SGT
HOLLINS, John E.		SGT
LAMB, B.S.		SGT
LAMBERT, James		SGT
LOWE, Donald D.		SGT
MENDIOLA, A.		SGT
McCLAIN, R.		SGT
MURRAY, Abraham		SGT
ROSE, Roger		SGT
SCOVIL, Kent B.		SGT
SMITH, M. E.		SGT
TARING, Udo		SGT
TICHENOR, Mifflin		SGT
ABRAMS, Freddie		SP4
ALVEREZ, David		SP4
ARNOLD, Dieter		SPL
COGHILL, Gaylen W.	*	SPL
DOOLE, Charles L.		SPL
EDWARDSON, Allen		SP4
GRACE, W. B.		SPL
GREEN, Coulter		SPL
HEIDMAN, Harry D.		SP4
		SP4
KELL, Donald L.		SP4
KNOX, Raymond		SP4
MARTIN, William		SPL
MILLER, James		SP4
MORTON, James R.		SP4
PRESSIEY, Leroy		
PREWITT, Billy		SP4
ROSE, Charles		SP4
SANTIAGO, Garcia		SP4
SIMON, Fred H.		SP4
SMITH, Donald W.		SP4 SP4
TEJERA, Victor		
THEILING, Albert		SP4 PFC
CREEK, Henry		
COCKRUM, L.		PFC
HAMPTON, James		PFC

Vietnamese Awards:	(9)	

lLT GRIGG, Donald FRAZIER, Wesley MORTON, James R. PSG PSG SP4 BANAITIS, Donatis SP4 BERNAL, Gregorio CAIDWELL, Michael SP4 WISELEY, William G. SFL PFC DONALDSON, Franklin PFC MORRIS, Jack H.

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BATTALION FERSONNEL KILLED IN ACTION

Operation Masher/White Wing

7	=500
Personnel Killed in	Action25
Adamson, Donald B.	2LT
Jurek, Dalmer O.	PSG
Hough, Matthew	SSG
Johnson, Jack	SSG
Smith, Marshall R.	SSG
Watson, William B.	SSG
Dale, Charles R.	SGT
Dyson, Charles E. J	r. SGT
Nevins, Patrick	SGT
Quinn, John	SGT
Stochaj, Paul T.	SGT
Thomas, Richard G.	SGT
El, Hondah D.	SP14
James, Joe N.	SP4
Rangle, Richard	SP4
Sanchez, Frankie	SPL
Coburn, William	PFC
Long, Éldon D. Mack, Robert L.	PFC
Mack, Robert L.	PFC
McDonald, Michael	PFC
Mulwee, Ísaih	PFC
Reynolds, Kenneth	PFC
Sexton, Jimmie C.	PFC PFC
Wilson, Farvin J.	PEC
Morris, Winston	1.00
Operation Lincoln	and Mosby
Personnel Killed in	Action24
McMillan, Donald F.	CPT
Britten, Lawrence	llt
Matthews, James	SSG
Grove, Richard	SGT
Horton, Floyd	SGT
Lute, Harry	SGT
Powell, David	SGT
Alferoff, Ivan	SP4
Chieves, Calvin	SP4
Hattabaugh, Paul	SP4
Hudson, Jonny	SP4
Johnson, Charles	SP4
Miller, Norman	SP4
Vinson, Henry	SP4
Baylor, Arthur	PFC
Barrios, Bernard	PFC

Operation Lincoln and Mosby Cont

Cannata, George A.	FFC
Elman, David	PFC
Holt, Dennis	PFC
Moore, James	PFC
Rose, Larry	PFC
Sherman, Ronald	PFC
Thompson, Alfred	PFC
Woods, Charles	PFC

One person Killed in Action during the Interim Period:

Wheaton, Allen PFC

Operation Crazy Horse

Personnel Killed in Action.....22

Sheperd, Edward	PSG
Futrell, Gary	SSG
Gaines, Charles	SGT
Randles, John	OPL
Crocker, David	SPL
Drummond, Austin	SPL
Harrison, Paul J.	SPL
Killilea, Martin	SPL
Post, Daniel G.	SP4
Spikes, Av	SFL
	SF L
Tynes, Earl	PFC
Benjamin, Robert	PFC
Benton, Henry	PFC
Booth, John	PFC
Brame, Clarence	
Brooks, James	PFC
Mack, Harold	PFC
Nadeau, Richard	PFC
Rhodes, Clifford	PFC
Tamayo, Joel	PFC
Taste, Wade	PFC
Williams, Lonnie	PFC

Personnel Missing in Action.....l

Buckley, Lewis SGT

Operation Henry Clay

No personnel killed during this period

Operation Paul Revere II
No personnel killed during this period
Operation Thayer I
Personnel Killed in Actionl
Shannon, Randell F. SF4
Operation Irving
Personnel Killed in Action5
Windham, James SP4 Caguimbal, Pepito PFC Dowdell, Marion PFC Royal, Francis PFC Salazar, Roy PFC
Personnel Died (Nonbattle)l
Creek, Henry L. PFC
Operation Thayer II
Personnel Killed in Action44
Cox, Chester G. Wallace, Gerald Jackson, Paul G. Earnest, Willie L. Jeemhis, Donald PSG Perpetua, Rogue Jr. Espinoza, Ellis SSG Greathouse, Julius Cook, William D. Deaton, Jack Garcia, Antonio Skipper, Hugh Burnette, Freddie Chisholm, Howard Erdos, Dennis Hull, Arnold Johnson, Ronald J. Jemon, Joseph Nelson, Henry J. Nunley, James F. Olzak, Raymond D. SFL Wilbur, Jack C. SFC PSG

Operation Thayer II Cont

Carothers, Richard L.	PFC
Davis, Alfred L.	FFC
Dent, Michael	PFC
Erwin, Hurbert A.	PFC
Ewing, Timothy	PFC
Goldberb, Howard S.	PFC
Graham, Armond R.	PFC
Hixson, Randall L.	PFC
Hollandsworth, Eddie O.	PFC
Kennedy, Alton R.	PFC
Iuna, Angel	PFC
McClennahan, Charles H.	PFC
Ortiz, Ulysses	PFC
Peasley, Gary W.	PFC
Poland, Harry	FFC
Schmeltz, Jerry E.	PFC
Stinson, George W. Jr.	PFC
Thomas, Reginald	PFC
Torrey, Raymond	FFC
Willis, Larry J.	FFC
Wilson, Darrell W.	PFC
witson, Darrett W.	
Personnel Died (Nonbattle)	2
Hall, Brownie	SSG
White, Ulysses	PFC

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Summa	ary of Friendly Casualties:
	Killed In Action122
	Missing In Action
	Wounded In Action456
	Malaria cases
Enemy	Casualties.
	Milled in Action (body count)
Awar	ds and Recommendations:
	Congressional Medal of Honor1
	Distinguished Service Cross3
	Silver Star42
	Soldier's Medal3
	Legion of Merit
	Eronze Star with "V" device104
	Bronze Star (Meritorious)67
	Army Commendation Medal with "V" device26
	Army Commendation Medal67
	Vietnamese Awards9

BIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

As this work is very current no reference material outside of the battalion was used. Part of the information came from personal knowledge and interviews with battalion personnel. The remainder of the information came from the following sources:

- Situation and After Action Reports, location: S-3 files, 1st
 Battalion.(Airborne), 12th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
- 2. DA Form 1594 Daily Staff Journal, Location: S-3 files, lst Battalion (Airborne), 12th Cavalry, lst Air Cavalry Division.

